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NAVIGATING THE NEXUS: UNRAVELING THE INTERPLAY OF COMPETITION LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL LANDSCAPE.

AUTHORED BY - BAHITRA BASU & SHRI DHARSHAN R.V

INTRODUCTION

There are a few qualities of the pharmaceutical sector, the job of patents, and the complex administrative climate, which present huge difficulties for the utilization of contest regulation. The pharmaceutical sector is a subject of regular antitrust investigations, with rivalry experts in the European Union and the Unified States exploring different industry rehearses. The business' high markups over minimal expenses and market focus, combined with extensive government intervention and the significant job of a patent security, present special difficulties in the utilization of rivalry regulation. This article underlines the requirement for a fair methodology that thinks about the ramifications of complete government assistance and buyer government assistance while tending to the pharmaceutical sector's practices through rivalry regulation.

The pharmaceutical business' particular qualities, including little peripheral costs compared with the decent expense of improvement, the minimal expense of impersonation, and the critical job of patent insurance, put it aside from different sectors. Patents are especially significant in the pharmaceutical sector, filling in as viable hindrances to passage against imminent opponents. Government intervention in pharmaceutical business sectors is extensive, with guideline taking different structures, including the guideline of section and cost. The article centres around two general classes of pharmaceutical sector guidelines in the European Union: the guideline of passage and the guideline of cost. IP policy addresses both, and the administrative necessities for acquiring market approval are altogether lower for generic drugs than for originator items. Notwithstanding, IP strategies safeguard the place of an originator for quite a while and cost not entirely settled at the public level compel market power, setting out exchange open doors because of cost guideline varieties in different Part States.

The essential concerns of EU contest experts in the pharmaceutical sector emerge from two kinds

of exercises. The first is the utilization of patent methodologies that might stop or defer generic passage, and the second is endeavoured by originator firms to restrict the free development of patented pharmaceuticals, otherwise called an equal exchange. This article sums up the financial aspects of the two exercises and evaluates the sufficiency of current contest regulation for tending to shortcomings. It additionally examines the difficulties presented by section guidelines, patent techniques, and patent settlements, giving a point-by-point examination of their effect on the pharmaceutical sector.

The intersection of competition law and intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical industry

The pharmaceutical sector is an exceptional and complex industry that is vigorously affected by the interaction of rivalry regulation, scholarly property (IP), and administrative systems. Patents assume an essential part in the pharmaceutical sector, filling in as compelling boundaries to passage against forthcoming opponents. This is because of the business' unmistakable qualities, like little negligible costs comparative with the proper expense of improvement and the minimal expense of impersonation. Thus, patent insurance is fundamental for pharmaceutical organizations to recover their significant innovative work (Research and development) speculations and keep an upper hand on the lookout.

In the European Union, the administrative prerequisites for acquiring market approval for generic drugs are fundamentally lower than those for originator items. The administrative necessities for generic drugs are laid out by Mandate 2001/83/EC, which is like the ^[1]administrative prerequisites in the US. Public controllers handle most generic medication applications in the European Union, and the administrative pathways for generic endorsement diminish possibly inefficient furthermore, duplicative spending to lay out what is now known. In any case, administrative obstructions to generic passage are an unequivocal policy decision, and information restrictiveness gives originators a period during which to recover their expenses. For items previously endorsed after 2005 in the European Union, originators appreciate eight years of information selectiveness, during which no generic application is acknowledged, two years of extra market selectiveness, during which generic applications are not endorsed however might be surveyed in anticipation of send off, and one extra year on the off chance that the originator has given proof of clinical benefits from another utilization of the item, for a limit of 11 years. The qualification of generic passage changed across Part States until 2015, when the 10th year of information selectiveness lapsed all the while across all Part States for all items sent off decade earlier. IP approaches safeguard the

place of an originator for quite a while, and cost not entirely set in stone at the public level compel market power, setting out exchange open doors because of cost guideline varieties in different Part States.

The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is liable for guaranteeing that generic drugs are bioequivalent to the originator's medication. The administrative prerequisites for getting market approval for generic drugs in the European Union are laid out by Mandate 2001/83/EC, which is like the administrative necessities in the US. Public controllers handle most generic medication applications in the European Union, and the administrative pathways for generic endorsement decrease possibly inefficient and duplicative spending to lay out what is as of now known. The EMA expects that generic drugs exhibit bioequivalence to the originator's medication, meaning that the generic medication should have a similar dynamic fixing, strength, measurement structure, and course of organization as the originator's medication. The EMA additionally expects that the generic medication be produced agreeing to similar quality guidelines as the originator's medication. The EMA conducts a careful survey of the generic medication's application, remembering the information for bioequivalence, prior to conceding market approval. The EMA additionally screens the security and viability of generic drugs after they are available. The administrative necessities for generic drugs are altogether lower than those for originator items, yet the EMA guarantees that generic drugs meet the same principles for security, viability, and quality as the originator's drug.

The relationship between competition law and intellectual property (IP) in the pharmaceutical sector is mind boggling and frequently problematic. The use of competition law to pharmaceuticals is especially testing, particularly in the European Union, where country-level pharmaceutical guidelines and IP law might slow down the objective of a normal market. The pharmaceutical business contrasts from most others in three key regards, which have critical ramifications for the utilization of competition law and IP. To begin with, the negligible expenses of creation in the pharmaceutical sector are for the most part little comparative with^[1] the decent expense of improvement, and the expense of impersonation is additionally generally low. This cost structure makes sense of why patents are referred to as more significant in the pharmaceutical sector than in any remaining sectors Second, patent security is critical in the pharmaceutical sector, as it safeguards pioneers from impersonation temporarily and permits them to charge significant markups over peripheral expenses to recover the fixed expenses of advancement. Patents are particularly significant in the pharmaceutical sector since they can be an extremely successful

hindrance to passage against forthcoming adversaries.

Third, government intervention in pharmaceutical business sectors is extensive, with guideline taking many structures, from examinations of fabricating offices to limitations on promoting. The guideline of passage and cost in the pharmaceutical sector in the European Union is a huge worry, as it might slow down the objective of a typical market. The essential worries of EU competition experts in the pharmaceutical sector emerge from two sorts of exercises. The first is the utilization of patent techniques that might stop or defer generic section, and the second is endeavors by originator firms to restrict the free development of patented pharmaceuticals, otherwise called equal exchange. The relationship between competition law and intellectual property in the pharmaceutical sector is affected by the business' interesting qualities, the extensive dependence on patents, and the complex administrative climate. This relationship presents critical difficulties for the utilization of competition law to the pharmaceutical business, especially in the European Union.

Bioequivalence Among Generic Drugs

The meaning of bioequivalence with regards to generic drugs is vital to guaranteeing their therapeutic comparability to the originator's drug. Bioequivalence alludes to the shortfall of a huge contrast in the rate and degree to which the dynamic fixing in a pharmaceutical item opens up at the site of medication activity when controlled at similar molar portion under comparable circumstances. In more straightforward terms, a generic medication is considered bioequivalent to the originator's medication when the rate and degree of retention of the dynamic fixing into the circulation system don't show a huge distinction from the first medication. This implies that the generic medication will have the same therapeutic impact as the originator's medication, as they are retained into the circulation system at a similar rate and in a similar way. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) and other administrative specialists require generic medication producers to lead bioequivalence studies to exhibit that their items are bioequivalent to the originator's drug. These examinations include looking at the pharmacokinetic boundaries of the generic medication to those of the originator's medication, such as the greatest convergence of the medication in the blood and the time it takes to arrive at this focus. Assuming the generic medication meets the bioequivalence standards, it is viewed as therapeutically identical to the originator's medication and can supported for market and use. This guarantees that patients can believe in the security and viability of generic drugs, as they are expected to have something very similar therapeutic impact as the first medication.

In the event that a generic medication isn't bioequivalent to the originator's medication, it might not have a similar therapeutic impact as the first medication. This can lead to serious ramifications for patients, as they may not get the expected treatment or may encounter unfavorable impacts. Bioequivalence is significant to guaranteeing the wellbeing and adequacy of generic drugs, as it guarantees that the generic medication has a similar dynamic fixing, strength, dose structure, and course of organization as the originator's medication. In the event that a generic medication isn't bioequivalent, it may not be supported for showcasing and use by administrative specialists like the European Medicines Agency (EMA). Moreover, on the off chance that a generic medication isn't bioequivalent, it will most likely be unable to contend really with the originator's medication, as patients and medical care suppliers might favor the originator's medication because of worries about the wellbeing and adequacy of the generic medication. This can restrict patient admittance to reasonable medicines and decrease the potential expense investment funds related with generic drugs. Therefore, guaranteeing bioequivalence is basic to advancing competition in the pharmaceutical sector and working on quiet access to reasonable medicines

Challenges of Applying Competition Law to the Pharmaceutical Sector.

The pharmaceutical sector represents a few difficulties while applying^[1] competition law, which can be summed up as follows:

1. High markups and market focus: Pharmaceutical items frequently have high markups over peripheral expenses, and standard proportions of market focus can be high, contingent upon market definition.
2. Government intervention: The pharmaceutical sector is vigorously controlled, with extensive government intervention in regions like passage and valuing
3. Patent security: Patent assurance is significant in the pharmaceutical sector, as it safeguards trend-setters from impersonation for a restricted time and permits them to charge significant markups over minimal expenses to recover advancement costs. In any case, the utilization of patent procedures to deflect or postpone generic passage has raised worries among competition specialists
4. Equal exchange: Equal exchange, or the development of patented pharmaceuticals across borders, is another area of worry in the pharmaceutical sector. The European Union's policy of weariness of IP privileges empowers the free development of pharmaceutical

items across borders, making exchange potential open doors if cost guideline brings about various costs in different Part States

5. Country-level guidelines and IP law: In the European Union, country-level pharmaceutical guidelines and intellectual property (IP) law might impede the objective of a typical market.
6. Patent settlements: Switch installment settlements in the drug area have been a subject of discussion, with some contending that any settlement in which the opposite installment surpasses a gauge of case costs is anticompetitive and ought to be treated as unlawful in essence. Others recommend that the impacts of opposite installment settlements on buyer government assistance are vague and should be assessed dependent upon the situation
7. Cost guidelines: The drug area is compelled by public level cost guidelines, which are conflicting with the presence of a genuinely normal market.

[[L]] [[SEP]] Balancing innovation with competition.

Pharmaceutical companies face the test of balancing the need for innovation with the need for competition. The pharmaceutical sector is unique in that the marginal expenses of production are little relative to the fixed expense of development, and the expense of imitation is generally low. This creates a situation where patent protection is crucial, as it permits innovators to charge substantial markups over marginal expenses to recoup the fixed expenses of development. However, the application of competition law to pharmaceuticals is frequently problematic, particularly in the European Union where country-level pharmaceutical regulations and intellectual property (IP) law may interfere with the objective of a typical market. The pharmaceutical industry's arguments related to research and development (R&D) investment are difficult to prove and are not specific to pharmaceuticals. The industry frequently receives criticism for insufficient utilization of tiered pricing, which aims to ensure affordability for the poorest population section, in order to promote admittance to treatments<sup>[[L]]
[[SEP]]</sup> in low-income countries. The pharmaceutical industry's arguments related to research and development (R&D) investment are difficult to prove and are not specific to pharmaceuticals. The industry frequently receives criticism for insufficient utilization of tiered pricing, which aims to ensure affordability for the poorest population section, in order to promote admittance to treatments in low-income countries.

What is Tiered Pricing and how does it affect access to medicines in

low-income countries?

Tiered pricing is a strategy used by pharmaceutical companies to offer different prices for similar product to different customers or markets, based on factors like income, geography, or the phase of the product's life cycle. This approach aims to increase admittance to medicines in low-income countries by offering lower prices to those who need them most. The European Commission's Tiered Pricing Regulation explicitly recognizes the benefits of differential pricing for access outside the European Union. Under Article 168(7), EU Member States retain the right to impose pharmaceutical price controls as part of managing their wellbeing frameworks, presumably on the grounds that a "one-size-fits-Europe" price is not optimal. This takes into account price differentiation within the EU, which can assist with increasing admittance to ^[11]pharmaceuticals in low-income countries.

However, the utilization of tiered pricing can likewise raise concerns about potential negative consequences for innovation and competition. Some argue that tiered pricing might lead to reduced R&D investment or the quality and quantity of innovation, as profits decrease. Others propose that the relationship between higher profits and R&D investment is not satisfactory cut, and that the impact of tiered pricing on lengthy run welfare might be negative provided that R&D investment or the quality and quantity of innovation fall.

Tiered pricing can be a valuable strategy to increase admittance to medicines in low-income countries. However, it is essential to consider the potential impact on innovation and competition, and to strike a harmony between providing affordable admittance to medicines and maintaining incentives for innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.

The Impact of Competition Law on India's Pharmaceutical Sector.

The pharmaceutical sector is a crucial contributor to the Indian economy, however it is likewise a subject of frequent antitrust scrutiny. The industry's unique characteristics, for example, high markups over marginal costs, extensive government intervention, and the crucial role of patent protection, present significant hurdles in the application of competition law. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has dealt with around sixty cases related to the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector, highlighting the need for optimal regulation in the sector. This article examines the judicial pronouncements of the CCI and the reasons for monopolistic trade practices in the pharmaceutical sector.

One of the malpractices in which trade associations are involved is the collection of No Objection Certificate (NOC) endlessly letters of credit by paying fees as ascertained by the association. The CCI has held that such acts are violative of the provisions of the Competition Act 2002. In the case of M/s Arora Medical Hall, Ferozpur v. Chemists and Druggists Association Ferozpur, the association had violated S.19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, by imposing a sum of Rs.2100/- for obtaining a NOC certificate and a letter of credit on all the chemists/druggists who wanted the distributorship for medicines in Ferozpur. The informant petitioner disagreed to pay the said charges, and as a result, the association not just boycotted the informant yet additionally defamed them and passed a resolution in the general body meeting to blacklist the petitioner from the pharmaceutical business.

Another issue in the pharmaceutical sector is the high trade margins, which is one of the major reasons for the considerably high drug prices in India. The CCI has suggested introducing the system of public procurement widely to avail essential drugs at a standard price, which can help in curbing the problems of high pricing due to a long distribution chain. Supplying medicines through online platforms with certain regulations can also be a transparent and healthy competition among various retailers.

The competition between branded generic versions of drugs in India is largely based on brand and not on prices. The CCI has emphasized the need for optimal regulation in the pharmaceutical sector, identifying regulatory gaps/overreach and necessary regulatory reforms as critical factors that need to be assessed for determining affordable and quality healthcare through well-functioning markets.

India produces drugs of worth US \$ 33 billion amongst which forty percent of the drugs are exported to other countries. Interestingly even after such a massive production about 50-65% people in India does not have a consistent access to the crucial and essential medicines as a result of which most of the expenses personal expenses are spent on medicines or for healthcare aspects. Further, high trade margins is one of the major reasons as a result of which the drug prices in India are considerably high, The same is evident from the tremendous disparity in the drug prices existing and varying from state to state. For instance there is a high disparity in the market prices and the prices at which the same drugs are purchased by the states like Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are under the public procurement and distribution systems. Moreover, high margins influences that which drug is to be sold or distributed by the traders and are used as a bonus/incentive by the

drug companies to market their products. Also the self regulation by various trade associations to control the entire mechanism of drug distribution are responsible for such high prices of drugs and in the in a way completely disables the competition in the country.

In the notable case of East Line Projects Pvt. Ltd. V. Dr. B. Borooah Cancer Institute Guwahati, a tender condition pertaining to the establishment of a pharmacy was contested. The challenge was based on the assertion that allowing a stockist to compete with distributors or retailers could potentially constitute an abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. However, the court, taking into consideration the explicit purpose behind establishing the pharmacy, concluded that the Competition Act, 2002 did not apply in this unique circumstance. This study aims to analyze similar cases within the pharmaceutical industry, investigating the factors contributing to the prevalence of anti-competitive and monopolistic trade practices in the sector.

The pharmaceutical sector's interaction with competition law is complex, given its unique characteristics and the extensive reliance on patents. The CCI's judicial pronouncements highlight the need for optimal regulation in the pharmaceutical sector to ensure affordable and quality healthcare through well-functioning markets. The causes of monopolistic trade practices in the pharmaceutical sector need to be addressed to maintain a healthy competitive market environment.

Critical Analysis

The pharmaceutical industry has unique characteristics such as high fixed costs for R&D and low marginal costs of production that make patent protection crucial. However, there are concerns about anti-competitive practices aimed at extending patent protection and preventing generic entry. In my view, while patent rights are important for incentivizing innovation, the pharmaceutical industry has exploited these rights to engage in anti-competitive tactics that harm consumer welfare. Strategies like pay-for-delay settlements and patent thickets seem aimed at blocking generics rather than promoting innovation.

In the EU, competition authorities have focused on patent settlement agreements and strategies to delay generic entry. For example, pay-for-delay settlements where originators pay generics to drop patent challenges and delay entry may be anti-competitive. Authorities assess these on a case-by-case basis. Other concerning strategies include patent thickets, litigation against generics, and "life cycle management" to extend patent protection through new formulations. Pay-for-delay

settlements are clearly anti-competitive in my view. Reverse payments exceed any reasonable estimate of litigation costs and the timing of settlements reveals their purpose is to block generics. The patent alone provides incentives – these deals just extend the monopoly. Banning them does not reduce incentives much empirically. Authorities should categorically prohibit these agreements.

In India, the CCI has actively investigated anti-competitive practices in pharmaceutical like price fixing and abuse of dominance. High trade margins have resulted in high drug prices, evidencing the lack of sufficient competition. However, India also has a unique scenario where competition is focused on branded generics, rather than prices. Self-regulation by trade associations has also raised competition concerns. But promoting branded generic competition alone may not reduce prices sufficiently without addressing anti-competitive conduct.

While patent rights do aim to promote innovation, extending protection excessively can substantially harm consumer welfare. Authorities should take a more palpable approach to pharmaceutical patent practices and settlements aimed at blocking generics. But some settlements may still be pro-competitive, so a balanced case-by-case approach is needed. Policies like tiered pricing can also enhance access without excessively reducing R&D incentives. Authorities have allowed too much anti-competitive behavior in pharmaceutical^[1] industries under the guise of patent rights. However, some balance is needed – we cannot eliminate patent protection altogether. But reforms should aim to restrict strategies of extending monopolies without enhancing innovation, while expanding access through tiered pricing. Ultimately consumer welfare should be the priority.

CONCLUSION

Finally, the pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated by the government in a variety of ways, including entry and price controls. The European Union divides pharmaceutical regulation into two basic categories: entrance regulation and price control. Intellectual property (IP) policy addresses both of these regulatory concerns. Generic medications have much fewer regulatory criteria for obtaining market authorization compared to originator products. However, intellectual property protections safeguard an originator's position for some time, and national pricing controls constrain market power, creating arbitrage opportunities owing to price regulation variations across Member States. Patents are particularly significant in the pharmaceutical industry, as they

act as strong barriers to entry against potential competitors. The principal concerns of EU competition authorities in the pharmaceutical sector stem from two sorts of activities: the employment of patent methods that may dissuade or delay generic entry, and attempts by originator businesses to restrict the free movement of patented drugs.

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